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In the Great Recession most OECD countries used short-time work (publicly subsidized 
working time reductions) to counteract a steep increase in unemployment. We show that 
short-time work can actually save jobs. However, there is an important distinction to be made: 
While the rule-based component of short-time work is a cost-efficient job saver, the 
discretionary component appears to be completely ineffective. In a case study for Germany, 
we use the rich data available to combine micro- and macroeconomic evidence with 
macroeconomic modeling in order to identify, quantify and interpret these two components of 
short-time work. 
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1 Introduction
"Germany came into the Great Recession with strong employment protection legislation. This has
been supplemented with a “short-time work scheme,” which provides subsidies to employers who
reduce workers’ hours rather than laying them off. These measures didn’t prevent a nasty recession,
but Germany got through the recession with remarkably few job losses." (Paul Krugman, 2009)
In the Great Recession 25 out of 33 OECD countries used short-time work as a fiscal stabilizer.
In countries such as Germany, Italy and Japan, more than 2% of the workforce were on short-time
work in 2009, leading to fiscal expenditures of more than 5 billion Euro in each of those countries
(see, e.g., Cahuc and Carcillo, 2011 and Figure 7 in the Appendix or Boeri and Bruecker, 2011). Yet,
our knowledge about the business cycle effects of short-time work (STW henceforth) is limited so
far. The purpose of this paper is to use German microeconomic and macroeconomic data as well as a
macroeconomic model of the labor market in order to study the role of STW as a fiscal stabilizer.1
Germany has had a long tradition of STW and has used STW also outside of recessions.2 Further-
more, Germany offers rich microeconomic data on the use of STW in establishments. In Germany,
firms can use STW at any time subject to a set of rules. In order to be eligible, a firm has to con-
vince the Federal Employment Agency (“Bundesagentur für Arbeit”) that the expected demand for
the firm’s products is lower than its production potential and that it thus has to reduce its labor input.3
If the Federal Employment Agency approves the STW application, it partly compensates workers for
their lost income. The purpose of this instrument is to encourage firms to adjust labor input along the
intensive margin (hours reduction) rather than the extensive margin (firings). Typically, more firms
are eligible to use STW during a recession than during a boom. Thus, similar to the tax system, the
institution STW as such can have automatic stabilization effects. We call this the rule-based compo-
nent of STW. Beyond this, the German government frequently changes specific features of this rule
such as the eligibility to use STW, i.e., there is also a discretionary component of this policy.
From the perspective of employers and forward-looking employment relationships, one might
expect that the discretionary and rule-based components of STW have rather different effects on the
economy. An important goal of this paper is to disentangle the potentially different effects of these
two features of STW. The availability of both microeconomic panel data and macroeconomic time-
series data from Germany makes this possible. In contrast with existing studies, which do not discuss
the possible confounding of the two features of STW, we find that whereas the rule-based component
does work as an automatic stabilizer, unexpected discretionary STW appears to have no effect on
unemployment. Given that many attribute much of the relatively favorable German unemployment
experience during the last recession to the extra efforts at providing short-time work, this is arguably
a surprising finding. It suggests more generally that the benefits of having a discretionary component
of STW as a standard part of the labor-market policy toolkit are limited.
1Recent empirical cross country studies on STW (Cahuc and Carcillo, 2011, Arpaia et al., 2010, Hijzen and Venn,
2011, IMF, 2010 and OECD, 2010) found positive employment effects but were restricted to the Great Recession and thus
miss the time-series perspective. For microeconomic studies with German data see Bellmann et al. (2010), Bellmann and
Gerner (2011) and Speckesser (2010). The macroeconomic fiscal policy literature has so far almost exclusively focused
on fiscal multipliers of traditional government tax and spending instruments. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Mountford and
Uhlig (2009), and Brückner and Pappa (2012) use structural VARs for this purpose and Cogan et al. (2010) or Christiano
et al. (2011) use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. See Braun et al. (2013) for a recent normative,
non-dynamic study, comparing the effects of STW to unemployment insurance.
2See Figure 1 (solid line) for post-unification Germany and Figure 8 in the Appendix for STW usage in Germany back
to 1975.
3See Burda and Hunt (2011, p. 297) or Brenke et al. (2013) for an excellent description of German “Kurzarbeit”.
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How can these findings be interpreted? We attempt at an answer by formulating a model of
a frictional labor market with STW. This setup allows us to study the relationship between STW
and unemployment explicitly. In particular, it highlights the importance of future expectations about
political institutions as an important determinant of hiring and firing on the labor market. As a matter
of modeling, to our knowledge our paper is the first to integrate STW with both a rule-based and a
discretionary component into a frictional labor-market model amenable to quantitative assessment.4
Our research strategy consists of three interrelated steps, namely the estimation of an elasticity
from microeconomic data, a structural vectorautoregression (SVAR) and the simulation of a macroe-
conomic model of the labor market. We use establishment level data to estimate the automatic reaction
of STW with respect to changes in output. Since all firms are subject to the same rules, we can use
the cross-sectional dispersion of STW usage and a measure of output over time in order to estimate
this elasticity. This elasticity is required for two purposes: First, we use it as a short-run restriction
on the contemporaneous variation between STW usage and output for the identification of a SVAR in
the spirit of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Second, it imposes discipline on the parametrization of our
macroeconomic model.
While the SVAR allows us to estimate the effects of unexpected discretionary STW policy inter-
ventions, the macroeconomic model allows us to run a counterfactual analysis of an economy with
and without STW and hence, to quantify the automatic stabilization effects. Our SVAR results show
that the effect of unexpected discretionary STW policy interventions on employment and unemploy-
ment is not statistically significant. However, we document a moderate stabilizing effect on output.
Our counterfactual model analysis shows that STW acts as a fairly strong automatic stabilizer. In our
baseline scenario, unemployment fluctuations are reduced by 21% and output fluctuations are reduced
by 4% (compared to the economy without STW).5
The model provides an explanation for the differences between automatic stabilization and the
effects of discretionary policy changes. The model consists of a standard search and matching frame-
work with endogenous separations and firing costs. We assume that STW is the only possibility of
labor adjustment along the intensive margin. This assumption can be justified on two grounds. First, it
reflects the fact that, in Germany, labor adjustment along the intensive margin mainly happens through
institutional channels such as STW (see Section 2 for a discussion). Second, we calibrate the model
such that it yields an elasticity of STW with respect to changes in output that is line with our em-
pirical estimates. Thus, we are confident that allowing for other possibilities of adjustment along the
intensive margin would not change our results significantly (for more details see Section 5).
In our model, workers are subject to idiosyncratic profitability shocks each period. Whenever the
profitability of a worker is low enough such that the worker would otherwise have been fired, the
government allows firms to use STW for this particular worker. The firm will decide to send her on
STW whenever it is more profitable to keep her at reduced working hours rather than to fire her. By
reducing the losses generated by unprofitable workers, STW directly reduces firing. By increasing
4Faia et al., 2013 use a labor selection model and analyze STW as one of several fiscal instruments to stimulate the
economy. Krause and Uhlig, 2012 use a search and matching model along the lines of Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2007 to
analyze the effects of the German Hartz labor market reforms. They do not model STW explicitly but introduce labor
market subsidies for the Great Recession to match the small increase in the unemployment rate during this period. Both
studies do not distinguish between the discretionary and the rule-based component, while we show that this distinction is
crucial for the evaluation of STW. Furthermore, our model describes the actual institutional features of STW in more detail
than these existing studies. This allows us to match the stylized facts of STW that we document in the data. See Section 5
for more details.
5As laid out in more detail in Section 5, the tax system that stabilizes employment and unemployment fluctuations to a
similar degree represents a much larger share of GDP than STW. Thus, we consider the stabilizing effect of STW as very
strong relative to its costs.
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the value of a job, STW indirectly increases hiring. During a recession more workers become au-
tomatically eligible for STW. This implies that more of the labor adjustment can be accomplished
through the intensive margin relative to the extensive margin, as intended by the policy. This way,
STW automatically stabilizes employment and, with it, output. In contrast, discretionary changes in
the eligibility criterion of STW do not lower unemployment in our model if they are not used persis-
tently, and, hence do not affect future expectations. Then, the policy change subsidizes workers that
would not have been fired anyway. However, the policy change may have some effects on aggregate
output by reducing the working time of inefficient worker-firm pairs.
Our baseline model encompasses institutional features such as firing costs and collective wage
bargaining that describe a typical central European economy with relatively low labor market flow
rates like the German one. Our analysis shows that these institutions matter for the effects of STW. In
an economy with flexible labor markets (low firing costs, high flow rates, individual bargaining), the
stabilizing effects of STW are much lower than in an economy with rigid labor markets. This result
corresponds neatly to the empirical fact that mainly countries with rigid labor markets make extensive
use of STW (see Figure 7 in the Appendix).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents some stylized facts on STW
in Germany. Section 3 presents the microeconometric evidence on STW. Section 4 discusses the
evidence from the structural VAR. Section 5 describes the model. Section 6 shows the simulation
results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Short-time work facts
2.1 Short-time work over the business cycle
Germany has had a very long tradition of STW institutions. This allows us to assess the movements
of STW over the business cycle. The year 1975 marks the beginning of the systematic use of STW
schemes in Germany, although STW has been used even before. Due to the oil price shocks and the
subsequent recession, the German legislature passed a law inscribing the future use of STW schemes
to be targeted explicitly to support employment, not to insure workers against wage cuts. In 1975, the
legislature also established the reimbursement of workers covered by STW schemes to be 60% of the
current wage. This law is still in place today.6
The solid line in Figure 1 shows the quarterly fraction of workers that are covered by STW
schemes relative to total employment in Germany from 1993 to 2010.7 We refer to this series as
STW usage or the extensive margin of STW in the following. We show the series in logs for easier
inspection and since this is the transformation used in the empirical exercises. The dashed line in
Figure 1 depicts the intensive margin of STW, measured by the average hours reduction (relative to
full time) of workers covered by STW programs. We use the post-reunification period as our baseline
sample for two reasons. First, this excludes the usage of STW related to the transition period after
reunification as well as the use of STW compensation in lockouts until 1986. This ensures that the
VAR attributes movements in STW usage to discretionary policy changes that were implemented to
stabilize employment in response to the business cycle (“konjunkturelle Kurzarbeit”). Second, we
have information about the cyclical behavior of the intensive margin of STW in the shorter sample.
We use this additional information to check the validity of our model.8
6See Flechsenhar (1979), Will (2010) and Brenke et al. (2013).
7Compare Table 5 in the Appendix for the data sources of all time series used in the analysis.
8We have information on the extensive margin of STW since 1975, compare Figure 8 in the Appendix. The long series
consists of numbers for West Germany before and West and East Germany after the reunification in 1991. The data for West
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Figure 1: The extensive and the intensive margin of STW 1993-2010. The extensive margin of STW is measured by
the log number of short-time workers as a fraction of total employment (left scale). The intensive margin of STW
depicts the average hours reduction by those on STW as a fraction of hours worked when full-time employed (right
scale).
On average, 0.69% percent of the workforce were working short-time in the post-reunification
period (0.83% in the long sample starting in 1975). Two large peaks indicate heavy use of STW
institutions and, possibly, active discretionary policy favoring the use of STW: the post-unification
period of the early 1990’s and the recent Great Recession (in addition, the mid 1970’s and early
1980’s in the long sample, i.e. the two oil price shocks ). About 1.5 million or 3.8% of workers in
Germany were on STW at the peak of the Great Recession in May 2009. But also outside the severe
recessions, the graph documents substantial variation in the series. STW usage both inside and outside
severe recessions is negatively correlated with growth in GDP and employment and hence the business
cycle (see Figure 9 in the Appendix). These contemporaneous correlations are potentially driven by
two effects that are of interest to us: the rule-based and the discretionary component of STW. In
our model in Section 5, STW automatically increases in a recession because more firm-worker pairs
are unprofitable and thus eligible to use STW. Beyond this, policy makers may facilitate the access
to STW in a discretionary way. In Section 3 and 4, we estimate the rule-based and discretionary
component of STW in the data.
2.2 Adjustment of labor input via STW
For the cyclical adjustment of labor input (total hours worked) in Germany, the extensive margin of
labor input (number of workers) is generally more important than the intensive margin (hours per
worker).9 In contrast to the US, the importance of adjustment along the intensive margin increases
Germany and total Germany perfectly co-move except for a short period after the reunification in which STW was heavily
used in East Germany to alleviate the transition from a planned to a market economy. We use the long time series to check
the robustness of our results in Section 4.
9Between 1970Q1 and 2012Q2, 57% of labor input in Germany is adjusted along the extensive margin. Outside the
large recessions, the extensive margin accounts for about 63% of the overall adjustment of labor input. We measure this
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Figure 2: Hours per worker (solid line) are measured by total hours worked divided by employment. The hours
reduction per worker due to STW (dashed line) multiplies the hour reduction per STW worker with the fraction of
short-time workers in employment. The sample shows annual averages from 1993 to 2010. Both series are HP
filtered with λ = 1, 600, the hours per worker cycle is multiplied with 100 for presentational reasons.
in recessions in Germany. This was the case in particular in the Great Recession (10% adjustment
along the extensive margin versus 90% adjustment along the intensive margin), as also documented in
Burda and Hunt (2011). Our model reflects the fact that labor adjustment along the intensive margin
becomes more important in recessions.
The intensive margin of labor input, given by hours worked per worker, can vary because the num-
ber of workers covered by STW programs (extensive margin of STW) changes since these workers
work fewer hours than the regular full-time employed. Hours per worker can also vary when those on
STW programs work more or less within these programs (intensive margin of STW). Figure 1 shows
that these two STW margins are negatively correlated (with a correlation of −.90). This means that
when more workers are covered by STW programs, hours worked of these workers increase, i.e., the
more workers are on STW, the lower is the reduction in hours worked due to STW. At first this seems
surprising, but our model provides a plausible intuition: Workers whose profitability is too low to be
kept full-time employed, but too high to be fired, will work reduced hours under the STW scheme.
The less profitable a worker is, the shorter she will work. During a recession more workers are fired.
This cleansing effect increases the average quality of short-time workers (in terms of idiosyncratic
profitability), and hence lowers the optimal average hours reduction in recessions.
Figure 2 (dashed line) shows a measure of the reduction of hours worked per worker due to STW
as the product of the hours reduction per STW worker and the fraction of short-time workers in em-
ployment. This measure strongly comoves with hours worked per employee (solid line) in the econ-
as in Fujita and Ramey (2009) using the cyclical components (filtered with the HP filter with λ = 1, 600) of total hours t,
hours per worker h and employment n. The proportion of the intensive margin is given by cov(t,h)
var(t)
, the proportion of the
extensive margin is given by cov(t,n)
var(t)
. Similar to the case of Germany, Reicher (2012) shows that the extensive margin is
most important for labor adjustment in most of the continental European countries.
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omy (with a correlation of −.69 measured using cyclical deviations from an HP-trend). Although this
simple correlation does not provide a formal test, it suggests that STW is an important determinant of
labor adjustment along the intensive margin. Complementing our findings, Abraham and Houseman
(1994) find in a study for the 1970’s and 1980’s that the existence of STW schemes renders the hours
adjustment in Germany equally flexible as the US adjustment.
Burda and Hunt (2011) decompose the hours reduction in the Great Recession into various differ-
ent sources of adjustment. Their results emphasize the notion that labor market frictions in Germany
are such that adjustment along the intensive margin is relatively costly due to rigid institutional con-
straints, e.g., heavy working time regulation. Given these constraints, adjustment along the intensive
margin mainly happens through institutions, such as STW, but also working time accounts, overtime
or regular part-time work.10 Our establishment survey data described below documents that firms that
operate working time accounts tend to use more STW than other firms. This indicates that working
time accounts and STW are complements rather than substitutes when adjusting hours. Taking annual
averages at a quarterly basis in Figure 2 helps us to (at least partly) wash out the influence of overtime
or working time accounts. Complementary, Burda and Hunt (2011) identify STW as the most impor-
tant source of labor adjustment along the intensive margin. In our analysis, we focus exclusively on
one possibility to adjust the intensive margin of labor input, namely through STW. Hence, we provide
a lower bound of stabilization effects taking into account all possible ways of institutional adjustment
of hours. Consistent with this assumption, we do not target the overall changes in the intensive margin
to changes in output in our model, but use the results from our microeconometric analysis to calibrate
the elasticity of STW with respect to changes in output.
3 Estimating the short-time work elasticity using microeconomic data
3.1 Specification
In the time-series data presented in the previous section, it is not possible to distinguish whether
STW usage fluctuates because of changes in the business cycle (rule-based component) or because of
changes in policy (discretionary component). We estimate the automatic stabilization effects of the
rule-based component of STW from microeconomic data and use it for two purposes: First, in order
to disentangle the two components of STW in the structural VAR. Second, as the key calibration target
of our model and the corresponding stabilization exercise. In our model, the rule-based component of
STW describes the elasticity of STW usage to changes in output when STW rules remain unchanged.
When output drops, more worker-firm pairs become unprofitable and thus eligible to use STW. Firm
output can change because of idiosyncratic shocks or because of aggregate shocks. Without changes
in output, STW usage can only change when policy changes. We use this insight from the model in
order to estimate the rule-based component from a firm panel for recent years.
The time and cross-sectional dimension of the panel allows us to identify the rule-based compo-
nent of STW. STW policy in Germany is implemented at the federal level providing the same rules
for all firms. Hence, the cross-sectional variation of firm output and STW usage at a given point in
time provides information about the rule-based component. However, firms that use STW (or a lot of
STW) may systematically differ from firms that do not use STW (or very little STW). Consequently,
we use within-firm variation over time rather than between-firm variation in output and STW usage in
10With working time accounts, the total annual working time is kept constant, but hours can be adjusted within the year.
In contrast to STW, working time via accounts, overtime or part-time work can change, but is fully compensated by the firm.
STW programs subsidize wages and, hence, constitute a regulatory framework which loosens working-time regulations for
worker-firm pairs with bad idiosyncratic shocks, particularly in recessions.
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order to estimate the rule-based component. The following relationship describes the effect of output
xit on the fraction of short-time workers in employment yit in firm i and year t:
yit = xitβ1 + αi + γt + zitβ2 + uit.
Here, αi controls for time-invariant firm-specific effects in our estimation, hence systematic dif-
ferences between firms in our sample. In order to rule out that we pick up policy changes in our
estimation, we further include year-specific effects γt which measure changes in STW usage over
time when output does not change. The error term uit is white noise, zit denotes the vector of addi-
tional control variables that will be specified below. We estimate the elasticity of STW usage to output
changes using three different specifications: A linear specification and two non-linear models (a Tobit
and a Heckman model) that will be described in detail in the next section.
We employ the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) Establishment Panel, a representative
German establishment level panel data set that surveys information from almost 16,000 personal inter-
views with high ranked managers. The IAB panel contains information on the number of employees
in STW in each firm in four waves: 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2010.11 The number of short-time workers
in each firm is measured in the first half of year t. In order to abstract from firm-size, we denote
short-time workers relative to the total number of employees within a firm. This is also consistent
with our time-series measure and the definition of STW usage in the model. Note that the fraction
of short-time workers in employment can be zero for a given firm. In period t− 1, firms report their
expected revenue for period t. We use these values as our measure for firm-level output in period t
for three reasons: First, we argue that this is the relevant measure that the firm uses in the STW deci-
sion (firms apply at least three months before they use STW). Second, this variable reflects the notion
that firms have to show their need for STW, i.e., a danger of a reduction in labor input due to a fall
in revenue, already in their application to the employment agency.12 Third, using expected revenue
avoids a potential endogeneity problem in the estimation as the use of STW in period t affects current
profits in period t, but not previously expected revenue. As additional controls in the estimation, we
use the number of employees in the previous year as a measure of time-varying firm size. Further,
industry dummies allow for the possibility that firms within different sectors in the economy use STW
differently in a systematic way.
3.2 Results
Table 1 documents the estimation results. Across linear specifications (1 to 3), the effect of changes in
expected revenue on STW usage is precisely estimated to range between −2.80 and −3.13 depending
on whether we add year fixed effects or the size of the firm. These estimates measure the semi-
elasticity of STW usage (in levels) to changes in expected revenue (in logs) and imply that in response
to a one percent drop in expected revenue, firms have on average about 0.03 percentage points more
workers on short-time. Year fixed effects are negative in 2006 and positive in 2009 and 2010 indicating
that it is important to control for discretionary policy changes. Further, the larger the firm the more
STW is used in our sample.13
11This dataset is widely used in a number of different studies, see for example Dustmann et al. (2009). Data access
was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and subsequently through remote data access. Table 6 in the Appendix provides
descriptive statistics of the IAB establishment panel with respect to STW.
12See http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/zentraler-Content/Vordrucke/A06-Schaffung/Publikation/V-Kug-101-Anzeige-
Arbeitsausfall-ab-01-2012.pdf
13We look at various additional specifications for robustness of our results. First, for a subsample of those firms that
operate working time accounts, the STW reaction is stronger. Hence, more STW is used in firms with working time
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The linear specification ignores an important feature in the data. The firm makes two decisions
with respect to STW: First, whether to use STW or not (participation decision) and, second, how much
STW to use. In fact, across our sample, only 6.5% of all firms use STW on average, while for the
others the number of short-time workers is zero. We therefore estimate two further models, a Tobit
model and a Heckman selection model that take these non-linearities in the data into account.
log exp. derived year fixed employees observations
revenue elasticity effects in firm
Linear fixed effects
(1) −2.802∗∗∗ −4.003 39, 545
[0.306]
(2) −2.968∗∗∗ −4.240 yes 39, 545
[0.299]
(3) −3.131∗∗∗ −4.473 yes yes 31, 824
[0.342]
Fixed effects tobit
(5) −2.319∗∗∗ −3.313 yes 31, 824
[0.286]
(6) −2.614∗∗∗ −3.734 yes yes 31, 824
[0.311]
Fixed effects heckman
(7) −4.972∗∗ −7.103 yes 31, 824
[2.57]
(8) −4.87∗ −6.957 yes yes 35, 264
[2.75]
Table 1: Elasticity estimates. Dependent variable is the number of workers in STW over total employees in the firm.
∗∗∗ denotes 1% significance, ∗∗ denotes 5% significance, ∗ denotes 10% significance.
The Tobit model deals with the censored data, but does not model the participation decision ex-
plicitly. Following Wooldridge (2010, p. 835), we estimate a Tobit model with fixed effects using
pooled Tobit and Mundlak terms.14 We report censored marginal effects which means that our esti-
mates summarize the aggregate effect of a one percent change in expected revenue on the STW usage
of all firms. Due to the nonlinear structure of the model, marginal effects are computed for each value
of the right-hand side variables and are then averaged. Our estimate ranges from −2.32 to −2.61
(specifications 5 to 6) which corresponds to a response of STW of about .025 percentage points to a
one percent reduction in revenue. Again, our results are significant at the 1% level.
Different from the Tobit model, the Heckman selection model explicitly models the participation
accounts than in those without. Second, as the usage of STW is likely to differ across industries, we also include industry
fixed effects in the estimation as a robustness check. We can identify these effects, since some firms in our sample switch
industries over time. Our estimates are robust towards this modification. Last, we further add an interaction term of changes
in expected revenue and year-specific effects, allowing for the possibility that firms react differently to output changes in
different states of the business cycle. When including interaction terms, we calculate the elasticity based on β1 and the
average of the coefficients of the interaction terms over all years. Including interaction terms hardly changes the estimated
elasticity. Detailed results for all robustness checks are available upon request.
14As introduced by Mundlak (1978), we include firm-specific means of explanatory variables to capture permanent level
effects in our estimation.
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decision. In particular, we need to argue why and how the decision of a firm of whether to use STW or
not is determined differently from the decision on how many short-time workers to use. A panel ver-
sion accounting for individual fixed effects is derived in Wooldridge (1995).15 We use the fraction of
firms using STW in the firm-specific industry sector as the exclusion restriction to identify our Heck-
man model. We argue that a large fraction of direct competitors using STW increases the individual
firm-specific probability of using STW (as the stigma of admitting the need of STW is gone), while
it does not drive the firm-specific number of workers in STW. Indeed, substantial variation in this
variable exists across industries and we find significant effects on the STW decision in our estimation.
In analogy to above, we want to measure the marginal effect of changes in expected revenue on STW
over the whole sample of firms, and not only on those that use STW. In the Heckman approach, this
is equivalent to the coefficients from the pooled OLS estimation controlling for selection into STW.
Across Heckman specifications (7 to 8), our estimates range from −4.87 to −4.97 which means that
a one percent drop in expected revenue generates an increase of about 0.05 percentage points in STW.
Our estimates are significant, at least at the 10% level. Standard errors of the inverse Mill’s ratios
indicate that selection is present in our model specification.
Since we have estimated the automatic feedback effects of changes in expected revenue on the
use of STW in levels (a semi-elasticity), but use elasticities in the structural VAR and calibration of
the model, we transform this estimate into an elasticity by dividing it by the average STW use in the
sample of interest. For our baseline sample of 1993Q1-2010Q4 this corresponds to dividing by an
average STW use of 0.69%. We report the derived elasticity estimates in the second column of Table
1. Our most conservative estimate of the STW elasticity across specifications is −3.31, while we
obtain −7.10 at maximum.
4 SVAR evidence
4.1 Identifying short-time work shocks in a structural VAR
In the SVAR exercise we estimate the effects of discretionary STW policy on macroeconomic vari-
ables such as output and unemployment. The challenge when estimating these effects is that we do
not explicitly observe exogenous discretionary changes in STW policy. The reason is that STW pol-
icy is effective along many dimensions, e.g., with respect to the eligibility criteria of firms (which are
loosely defined and can potentially be interpreted very differently16), the legal allowances of the dura-
tion of workers in STW, or the degree to which the government can additionally reduce the firms’ cost
that is related to the use of STW (such as covering social security contributions of workers in STW17).
Instead of using a direct measure of STW policy, we use a SVAR in the tradition of Blanchard and
Perotti (2002)18 to estimate the effects of discretionary STW policy shocks based on a simple as-
sumption: Policy reacts with a one period implementation lag to changes in output. This seems to be
a reasonable assumption in quarterly data.
15Estimation is pursued by first estimating a probit for the selection in STW separately for each year t. In a second step,
we run a pooled OLS regression on the selected sample accounting for the inverse Mills ratios from step one and time fixed
effects. We correct for firm fixed effects by including Mundlak terms and obtain standard errors using a panel bootstrap.
See Wooldridge (2010, p. 835).
16See the discussion in Burda and Hunt (2011).
17See Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2011.
18Blanchard and Perotti (2002) seek to identify the effects of a shock in fiscal policy on output, hence the output multiplier.
We apply their framework in order to identify STW policy shocks.
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The general VAR setup is based on a reduced-form estimation of
Yt = B(L)Yt−1 + et, t = 1, ..., T,
where Yt is a N × 1 vector of endogenous variables, and the lag polynomial B(L) represents N ×N
coefficient matrices for each lag up to the maximum lag length k. The reduced-form innovations are
denoted by the N × 1 vector et, which are assumed to be independent and identically distributed
with mean zero and covariance Σe. We seek to identify the underlying structural shocks ωt from
transforming the reduced-form innovations et using a transformation matrix A such that
Aet = ωt.
In order to correspond to a model in which economic shocks are independent from each other, the
structural innovations ωt are assumed to be orthogonal (i.e., Σω is diagonal). Without loss of gen-
erality, we normalize the diagonal elements of Σω to unity. From orthogonality and normalization,
we obtain N(N + 1)/2 restrictions to identify the N2 elements of the transformation matrix A. In
order to exactly identify this matrix, we need N(N − 1)/2 additional restrictions in order to obtain
the underlying structural shocks. In a simple bivariate VAR, we hence need one additional restriction
in order to find A.19
Two variables are important for identification in the VAR: output and STW usage. Key to the
VAR exercise is to decompose the negative correlation between these two variables into an output
(or business cycle) shock and a discretionary STW policy shock. Note that the assumption about
the implementation lag of policy implies that all contemporaneous covariation of the STW usage and
output is described by the rule-based component of STW. Put differently, output (or business cycle)
shocks are defined through their automatic effects on STW usage in the short-run. This does not mean
that policy shocks are unrelated to the business cycle. In fact, our results below show that large STW
policy shocks occur during strong economic expansions and contractions.
We impose the value estimated from the microeconomic data in the previous section as the addi-
tional restriction on A as described above. Given that we have identified business cycle shocks via
the rule-based component of STW, all remaining variation of STW usage and output is then attributed
to discretionary changes in STW policy. Clearly, if the imposed automatic feedback effects from the
business cycle onto STW are negative and large, the effect of the policy shock on output is small. In
fact, if the negative automatic feedback effect is larger in absolute value than the negative covariation
between STW and output, the effect of policy shocks on output becomes positive on impact. Hence,
the value of the elasticity potentially plays a crucial role for the estimated effects of the discretionary
policy shocks.20 We look at robustness of the results to different values of this elasticity below and
find that, within a reasonable range, the elasticity only matters for the impact period.
Note that we identify the VAR with an elasticity describing how STW usage reacts to output
changes on the firm level. This elasticity is not necessarily equal to a macroeconomic measure of the
output elasticity of STW usage that would take into account all possible general equilibrium effects.
Informing the VAR with this elasticity means that we assume that the two are the same (or very
similar). In our model below, we argue that this is the case when labor market tightness does not
play an important role in the wage bargaining. This result naturally arises in a model of collective
19The identification in the bivariate VAR can be extended in a straightforward way to include more shocks and more
variables. The restrictions to identify output and policy shocks remains unchanged in this case and it is assumed that
additional shocks have no effect on output and the policy variable on impact. See Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Caldara
(2010) for a detailed description of the implementation.
20Caldara (2010) has pointed this out with respect to the estimation of government spending and tax shocks.
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wage bargaining, because the threat-point of the firm bargaining with a union cannot be to dismiss the
whole workforce. Collective wage bargaining is a realistic description of European labor markets like
the German one. If wages were allowed to adjust to changes in labor market conditions, our model
predicts the macroeconomic elasticity to be smaller than the estimated one. Intuitively, wages that
react more to business cycle conditions stabilize the value of a worker and thus rely less on STW. This
suggests that we might use a value too low for our identification. Our robustness checks below show
that smaller elasticities generate the same qualitative results.
4.2 Results
In our baseline estimation of the effects of business cycle shocks and exogenous STW policy changes,
we specify a VAR with three variables: the fraction of short-time workers in employment (in logs),
GDP growth and the log unemployment rate. We specify GDP in growth rates, since unit root tests
suggest that this variable has a unit root.21 In addition, we use GDP growth as measuring the business
cycle component of this variable, since we can compare this to the output of a model with a constant
steady state as the one presented below. We estimate the reduced form VAR as described above with
four lags in the specification. We then use the formal relationship between the output elasticity of STW
and the coefficients in the matrix A (as derived by Caldara (2010) in the case of government spending
or tax shocks) in order to implement the short-run restrictions. Here we use our lowest elasticity
estimate of −3.3 as our baseline. We estimate the VAR for our baseline sample 1993Q1-2010Q4.
To see whether our estimated STW policy and output shocks are plausible, we consider the his-
torical time series of the two shocks (shown in Figure 10 in the Appendix). Since these shocks are
calculated from the reduced form residuals in the VAR, they occur every period, but differ in sign and
magnitude. We do not literally interpret every one of these small shocks as an actual output shock or
discretionary policy shift. Rather, a moving average of the two shocks indicates periods of economic
as well as discretionary policy expansion and contraction. Note that, except for the same quarter, we
do not assume whether or how strong policy shocks are related to output shocks. Our identifying
assumption merely states that output shocks and policy shocks cannot exactly coincide. Our results
show that economic contractions and discretionary policy expansions generally have a (lagged) posi-
tive correlation, i.e., discretionary policy changes are related to the business cycle. The graph shows
that policy expansions (contractions) sightly lag the economic contractions (expansions), e.g., in the
contraction in the late 90’s, the expansion around 2008 and in the Great Recession. The graph also
shows that discretionary policy was not implemented in the economic contraction in the mid-2000’s.
These relationships reflect the usage of STW that was documented in Figure 1. Generally, STW policy
works along many dimensions most of which we cannot directly observe. One exception is the legal
maximum period of eligibility which is shown in Figure 12 in the Appendix. The Great Recession
episode illustrates that our estimated policy shocks coincide with periods in which this aspect of dis-
cretionary policy is changed such as the reduction in 2008 and the expansion of the eligibility period
in 2009 and its reduction in 2010.22
Figure 3 shows the quarterly responses of output, STW usage and unemployment to positive one-
standard-deviation shocks in output and policy. To be comparable to the model output in Section 5,
21In the case of unemployment, unit root tests give ambiguous results. If unemployment was integrated, it is clearly not
cointegrated with GDP. In line with the model and the literature, we treat unemployment as a stationary variable.
22As a robustness check, we can use the small time series of the eligibility period changes as a direct measure of one type
of STW policy shocks. As a result, output, STW usage and unemployment all increase as in our SVAR results. The results
are insignificant, however, which is the result of very little variation in the series. Hence, the conclusion that discretionary
STW policy is ineffective remains. The results are available upon request.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to output and STW policy shocks. SVAR estimated with log STW per employed
workers, GDP growth and the log unemployment rate for 1993Q1 to 2010Q4. Quarterly responses to a positive
one-standard deviation shock. Confidence intervals are 90% bootstrapped bands with 10,000 draws.
we show the response of output as deviations from a linear trend, i.e., in growth rates not in levels,
and the responses of the unemployment rate in percentage points. The confidence intervals depict
90% bootstrapped bands that were calculated in line with Kilian (1998). The left column of Figure 3
shows the responses to a positive business cycle shock. After this shock, output increases, while STW
falls reflecting the imposed short-run restriction of the automatic feedback effects along the business
cycle. Unemployment falls in a boom. The right column of Figure 3 depicts the responses to a positive
discretionary STW policy shock. After a positive policy shock, STW is used more. Since we have
not imposed any restriction on this response, it is reassuring that it is in fact positive. Output does
not show any significant impact response to a STW policy shock, except for a marginally statistically
significant increase after two quarters. Strikingly, the unemployment rate does not significantly react
to a STW policy shock. This is a surprising result, as STW schemes were initially designed to support
employment. Our model will provide an interpretation of this result: temporary discretionary changes
in STW policy do not affect future expectations, and therefore hiring and firing decisions.
4.3 Robustness
Above, we have discussed the importance of the imposed short-run restriction for the output elastic-
ity of the policy variable. Given this, we would like to know how different assumptions about this
elasticity affect the results, in particular the estimated responses of output and unemployment after a
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policy shock. Figure 11 in the Appendix compares these responses for various values of the elasticity.
Varying the elasticity does affect the impact response of GDP to the policy shock23. In line with our
intuition from above, the more of the negative correlation between output and STW usage is explained
by the automatic feedback effects, the larger and possibly positive are the effects of the policy shocks
on output. In fact, if the automatic feedback effects are relatively large, output significantly increases
on impact. If they are zero or positive, output falls, significantly in the latter case. Note, however, that
the estimates for later periods hardly change when different elasticities are used.
The effect of policy shocks on unemployment behaves similarly when varying the elasticity. Un-
employment falls for relatively large negative elasticities and increases for zero or positive elasticities.
However, except for positive elasticities of unplausibly high values, these effects are all insignificant.
If we consider variation of the elasticity between −2.90 (corresponding to our most conservative
estimate in column one of Table 1 plus the estimated standard deviation), −4.56 (corresponding to
our largest Tobit estimate minus the respective standard deviation) and −11.90 (corresponding to
our largest Heckman estimate minus the respective standard deviation), the responses of output and
unemployment to policy shocks change very little.
We address the robustness of our results along various other dimensions. Table 7 in the Appendix
summarizes the results of our robustness checks.24 Most importantly, we consider whether the two
major recessions with a large use of STW in our sample reflect different dynamics in the response to
policy shocks than more normal times. In other words, there may be business cycle asymmetries
that affect our identification of the dynamics. In order to address this, we estimate our baseline
specification including recession dummies for 1991Q1-1993Q1 and 2008Q1-2009Q225 and show that
the results are not affected in any significant way.
As argued above, identification of STW policy shocks is difficult, as it potentially works along
many dimensions and we do not directly observe policy changes. One exception is the legal maximum
period of eligibility for a particular worker in STW. We have information about this for our baseline
sample, Figure 12 in the Appendix shows a plot. One may associate periods with legal changes to this
maximum period as episodes of particular political focus on STW schemes. In order to exclude the
possibility that STW policy was conducted in a systematically different way together with these legal
changes, we incorporate a dummy controlling for these changes into our VAR. This is similar in spirit
to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) who incorporate a dummy for particularly large tax reforms into their
fiscal VAR. Table 7 in the Appendix shows that our results are robust to controlling for legal changes
this way.
In our model, business cycle shocks are measured by changes in output or labor productivity. Table
7 shows that our results are robust to replacing GDP with GDP per employed worker in the specifi-
cation. This result may reflect the fact that relatively unproductive workers work short-time, while
relatively productive workers continue to work full time or even increase their labor input. Hence
their weight in aggregate productivity increases. We also use the GDP deflator instead of the CPI to
deflate output. This does not change our results substantially. In order to consider the robustness of the
unemployment response to policy shocks, we replace the unemployment rate by employment and total
hours worked respectively. As with unemployment, both variables react insignificantly to the policy
shock. Clearly, policy shocks do not have a significantly positive effect on hours or employment.
Output does not react significantly to policy shocks in this setup.
One may wonder whether our identified shocks pick up the effects of other shocks that are im-
23This is similar to what Caldara (2010) has shown in the case of tax shocks.
24Compare Table 5 in the Appendix for the data sources of all time series used in the analysis. More detailed results are
available upon request.
25We measure recessions, also in the long sample, as peak to trough of the GDP series that is HP-filtered with λ = 1, 600.
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portant for the macroeconomy. One candidate are shocks that cover future information about the
business cycle, so-called news shocks. In order to control for the presence of news shocks or any type
of anticipation effects in the economy, we include a business confidence indicator (the ifo business
climate index) into our specification. With this indicator, both unemployment and output do not react
significantly to policy shocks. Another candidate shock that may be captured in the business cycle
shock is a monetary policy shock. In order to control for this shock, we further include the interest rate
as measured by the 3-months money market rate into the specification. Table 7 shows that including
the interest rate into our specification does not change our baseline results. Moreover, we control for
movements in aggregate consumption and investment in two further VAR specifications. Again, this
does not change our results (cp. Table 7 in the Appendix).
Finally, we consider the long sample which covers 1975 to 2010. Starting our estimation in 1975,
we capture important economic events such as the oil crises in the data. However, we also face
a severe structural break in the macroeconomic data due to the German reunification in 1991. To
eliminate the level effect in the data, we regress the growth rates of GDP and unemployment on a
reunification dummy. We further account for a general structural break in the VAR using a broken
constant before 1991 and afterwards. In order to circumvent potential problems with the heavy use
of STW in East Germany directly after reunification for reasons not related to the business cycle, we
only use STW data for West Germany.26 Since the mean STW usage in the long sample is higher
than in the short sample (0.83%), we reduce our elasticity estimate to −2.79. Note that our elasticity
estimate stems from microeconomic survey data for the years 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2010. Thus, our
estimate possibly deviates from the true elasticity estimate in the long sample. This is less of a concern
in the short sample. In addition to estimating our baseline specification in the long sample, we also
add recession dummies (1973Q1-1975Q2, 1980Q1-1982Q2, 1991Q1-1993Q1 and 2008Q1-2009Q2).
Table 7 shows that the results are quite similar to the ones from the short sample. In contrast to
the short sample, output does not show any significant increases anymore. Unemployment increases,
though insignificantly. This documents that when taking into account early recessions, discretionary
STW policy changes have on average not been very successful in stabilizing employment or output in
recessions.
5 A labor market model with short-time work
5.1 Model description
Our paper quantifies the effects of the rule-based and the discretionary component of STW. While
the SVAR has shown the non-effects of discretionary policy changes on unemployment, it is silent
about the underlying economic rationale. In addition, we analyze the automatic stabilization of the
rule-based component of STW for which we need to model the counterfactual economy without STW.
Thus, we need a model that integrates important institutional features of the German economy to de-
liver credible results and that is rich enough for quantitative analysis. We use the search and matching
framework of Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) to model job findings and en-
dogenous job separations assuming that worker-firm pairs are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. We then
incorporate STW in this model.
A few words on specific assumptions of the model are in order: First, we assume that STW is
the only way to use the intensive margin of labor adjustment. This assumption can be justified on the
26As mentioned above, the series for the number of short-time workers in total and West Germany excluding the reunifi-
cation period have a strong correlation of 0.99.
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grounds that in normal times the extensive margin is far more important than the intensive margin,
while in deep recessions, STW plays a very important role in rendering the intensive margin more
flexible (see Section 2). Hence, we do not consider the role of instruments other than STW that may
make the intensive margin more flexible such as working time accounts. Note, however, that we
calibrate the model in such a way that the model-elasticity of STW with respect to changes in output
corresponds to its empirical counterpart (for more details see Section 6.1). Thus, if we included other
means of adjustment along the intensive margin in our model and did not change the parameters of
the model, the effects of STW would be diminished (as firms could use the other means of adjustment
as substitutes27) However, as a consequence the elasticity of STW with respect to changes in output
would not correspond to the empirical elasticity any more. Thus, we would have to recalibrate the
model to match the empirical elasticity. This would re-establish the importance of STW. We are thus
confident that the quantitative results would remain similar if we included other means of adjustment
along the intensive margin.
This issue would only be worrisome if we calibrated our model such that STW is responsible for
the adjustment of the entire intensive margin in deep recessions. Instead, we calibrate our model to
the elasticity of STW with respect to output that we have estimated in Section 3.
Second, firms in our model would reduce the working time of unprofitable workers to zero unless
they are subject to some form of adjustment cost. The data shows that a 100% working time reduction
rarely happens. Only for 8% of workers on STW the working time is reduced to zero. On average the
working time for workers on STW is reduced by approximately one third.28 To allow for a working
time reduction of less than 100% and to keep our model tractable, we assume that firms are subject to
convex costs of reducing working time. Below we provide some institutional underpinnings, but we
do not provide deep microfoundations for the observed firm behavior.
Third, we assume that wages are determined on the collective level (which is true for the majority
of contracts in Germany) and that the wage for a full-time worker is unaffected by the STW decision
of the firm (although a working time reduction obviously reduces the paid-out wage for a worker on
short-time). We also check for the robustness of our results by simulating a US style economy with
individual bargaining.
For normative work, it is crucial to provide a deep microfoundation as well as a constrained ef-
ficient benchmark for the interaction between the firm and the worker with STW. For our purposes,
i.e., the quantification of the rule-based component and an interpretation of the SVAR results, these
limitations are only of second order. Most importantly, the model does a very good job in replicating
the business cycle features of the extensive and intensive margin of STW and offers a plausible expla-
nation for the SVAR results. We further check the robustness of our results with respect to some of
the above mentioned assumptions, such as changing the bargaining rule or varying the level of firing
costs.
The timing in the model is as follows: First, agents in the economy learn about the level of
aggregate productivity. Second, unemployed workers search for a job and firms post vacancies. Third,
the matching function establishes contacts between workers and firms. Fourth, new contacts and
incumbent workers are hit by an idiosyncratic shock. Fifth, the wage is determined. Finally, firms
make their endogenous separation and STW decisions, based on the idiosyncratic shock realization.
27Evidence from the German establishment data in Section 3 suggests that firms that use working time accounts are also
more likely to use STW.
28From 1993-2010, 44% of all employees who used STW in Germany reduced their working time up to 25%, 33%
between 25 and 50%, 8% between 75− 99% and 8% to 100% (Source: Federal Employment Agency).
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5.2 Separation and short-time work decisions
Since STW is targeted at reducing separations, we start by deriving the separation decision and show
how it is affected by STW. As is standard in the literature we endogenize separations by assuming that
the profits generated by a worker depend on the realization of an idiosyncratic shock, ε. We assume
that the idiosyncratic component is additive and has the interpretation of a profitability shock. With
additivity, worker-firm pairs may generate negative contemporaneous value added, even with zero
fixed costs.29 The shock εt is drawn from the random distribution g(ε) and is i.i.d. across workers and
time. We will first describe the STW decision and then the firing decision because the latter depends
on the former.
The value of a worker with a specific realization of the idiosyncratic shock ε, who is not on STW,
is given by
J(εt) = at − wt − εt − cf + βEtJt+1, (1)
where a is aggregate productivity, w is the wage of the worker, cf is a fixed cost of production, β
is the discount factor and Jt+1 the expected value of the worker next period (see equation (11) for
the definition). The fixed cost of production cf was introduced by Christoffel and Kuester (2008)
to generate the large volatility of unemployment over the business cycle found in the data, without
resorting to wage rigidity or using a large value of unemployment benefits/home production.30
We assume that the government defines an eligibility criterion D for STW such that only workers
whose value is below that threshold are allowed to be sent on STW
at − wt − εt − cf + βEtJt+1 < Dt. (2)
We interpret D as an instrument to conduct discretionary STW policy. By lowering D, the government
makes the eligibility criterion more stringent and, thus, directly reduces the number of workers on
STW. In our benchmark calibration, we assume D = −f , where f is the cost of firing a worker. This
implies that the STW-threshold in equation (2) coincides with the firing condition of an equivalent
matching model without STW. This assures that only those workers are allowed to be sent on STW
that would otherwise have been fired. With this modeling choice we replicate the German rule that
says that any firm that is in difficulties such that it would otherwise have to fire a substantial part of
its workforce, can apply for STW. When quantifying and simulating the model in Section 6, we show
the effects of loosening the eligibility criterion, i.e., of increasing D.
Based on equation (2) we can define a threshold-level vk for the idiosyncratic component ε
vkt = at −wt + βEtJt+1 − cf −Dt, (3)
such that workers with εt < vkt work full-time, while workers with εt > vkt are allowed to be sent on
STW.31
29Interestingly, negative contemporaneous value added allows us to provide an interpretation for the SVAR results, i.e.,
why discretionary short-time work may have a positive effect on output. Note, however, that our result that discretionary
STW leaves employment unaffected does not depend on the additivity of the shock.
30It is well known from the literature that the search and matching model has trouble to replicate the labor market
amplification effects over the business cycle from the aggregate data (Shimer, 2005). See Costain and Reiter (2008) for a
discussion. We choose fixed costs as proposed by Christoffel and Kuester (2008) to solve this problem because it seems
the most innocuous assumption in the context of our approach (the alternative of larger unemployment benefits would, for
example, show up in the government budget constraint and thereby distort the cost and benefit analysis of STW).
31In contrast to Faia et al. (2013), this defines the rule-based component of STW. Worker-firm pairs with a lower prof-
itability level can automatically use STW and choose an optimal hours reduction. This allows us to calibrate our model with
the estimated elasticity and to quantify the automatic stabilization effects of STW.
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When a worker is eligible for STW, the firm has the option to adjust along the hours margin. With-
out any further restrictions, firms would choose 100% STW for unprofitable workers in our model.
However, as described above, the average working time reduction is only about one third. Assuming
a linear cost function would not solve this problem because it would imply corner solutions such that
workers either work full time or their working time is reduced by 100%. Therefore, we assume that
the optimal working time reduction K is subject to convex STW costs C (K (εt)), with ∂C(K(εt))∂K(εt) > 0
and ∂C(K(εt))
2
∂2K(εt)
> 0, which assures interior solutions. There are many institutional reasons in Germany
for such a convexity. First, although the employer reduces the labor costs with STW, the reduction is
not necessarily proportional to the working hours reduction because the employer has to pay the so-
cial security contributions for the full time equivalent.32 Second, the implementation of STW must be
approved by the workers’ council.33 As long as there is no approval, workers have the right to obtain
their full wage. Workers’ councils are generally more willing to approve small working time reduc-
tions than larger working time reductions because employees only receive a partial compensation for
their wage loss. Our convex adjustment function is a short-cut for the interaction of many factors
(besides the institutional features, the shape of the production function or variable capital utilization
may matter in reality). We defend our short-cut based on its empirical performance. We will show in
the simulations that our model replicates the cyclical movement of the number of workers on STW
and the average hours reduction due to STW very well.
The firm chooses the optimal level of the working time reduction K by maximizing the contem-
poraneous profit of a worker on STW:34
max
K(εt)
pit = (at − wt − εt)
(
1−K (εt)
)
− cf −C
(
K (εt)
)
. (4)
Note that the reduction in working time does not only reduce the output of the worker but also
reduces the wage payments and the idiosyncratic cost. However, it does not reduce the fixed cost cf
which is independent of the production level. We impose a quadratic functional form for the costs of
STW
C
(
K (εt)
)
= cK
1
2
K (εt)
2 . (5)
This implies that the optimal hours reduction of STW for a given ε is
K∗ (εt) = −
at − wt − εt
cK
. (6)
Naturally, the lower the profitability of a worker, i.e., the higher the realization of ε, the higher
the working time reduction (∂K∗(εt)
∂εt
> 0). We can now describe the firing decision of the firm, which
depends on the working time reduction K . Workers are fired if the losses they generate are higher
than the firing cost:
32See Bach et al. (2009) who show that these institutional features generate a convexity in the cost of STW. See also Boeri
and Bruecker (2011).
33German labor law makes it mandatory for firms from a certain size onwards to allow their employees to elect represen-
tatives (“Betriebsrat”, English: workers’ council).
34This is an important difference to the earlier models in Faia et al., 2013 and Krause and Uhlig, 2012. In contrast to these,
firms in our model decide optimally about the working time reduction of workers on STW, while in Krause and Uhlig, 2012
hours are not reduced at all and in Faia et al., 2013 the hours reduction is exogenous and the same for all firms. Endogenous
hours reduction is not only realistic but allows us to distinguish between the extensive margin and the intensive margin of
STW and base them both on optimal firm decisions. As demonstrated further below our model replicates well the empirical
movements of both margins.
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(at − wt − εt)
(
1−K (εt)
)
− C (K (εt))− cf + βEtJt+1 < −f. (7)
This defines a firing threshold vf at which the firm is indifferent between firing and retaining a
worker on STW:
vft = at − wt − cf +
EtβJt+1
1−K
(
vft
) + f
1−K
(
vft
) − C
(
K(vft )
)
1−K
(
vft
) . (8)
Thus, the endogenous separation rate is
φet =
∫
∞
v
f
t
g (εt) dεt, (9)
and the rate of workers on STW is
χt =
∫ vft
vkt
g (εt) dεt. (10)
All workers with a profitability shock realization above the STW threshold vkt are eligible for
STW, but workers above the firing threshold vft are so unprofitable that they are fired despite the
possibility to send them on STW.35 Note that STW exists in this economy if vft > vkt . This is the
case as long as STW costs are not prohibitively high. If the scale parameter or the STW cost function
cK approaches infinity, then K = 0 from equation (6), i.e., firms do not use STW. In this case the
STW cutoff and the firing cutoff are identical: vf = vk. This limiting case will be used for the
counterfactual analysis in the numerical part. If cK is smaller than at − wt − εt, the firm optimally
reduces hours worked for those on STW to zero. In that case, no firing occurs. For the value of cK that
we calibrate, the working time reduction for those on STW will be strictly between zero and 100%.
From equation (8) follows that positive values of the working time reduction K affect the firing
cutoff vf positively due to a direct effect and a reinforcing indirect effect. The working time reduction
directly reduces the losses generated by a worker and thereby makes the firm more reluctant to fire a
worker. At the same time, the possibility to reduce the future losses generated by a worker increases
the expected value of a worker, which indirectly lowers the incentives to fire. Both effects shift the
threshold vf upwards relative to vk and imply both a positive range of workers on STW and a smaller
range of workers being fired compared to the situation without STW in which vf = vk.36
Note that the existence of STW in our model does not depend on the exact bargaining regime, nor
on the assumption of positive fixed costs and/or firing costs. We need the fixed costs of production
to calibrate our model to the estimated elasticity of STW with respect to output. And we add firing
costs and collective bargaining to replicate realistic European institutions. But even if f = cf = 0
and under individual bargaining, some workers exist who would generate contemporaneous losses,
but who would not be fired. The reason is that costly hiring due to search and matching frictions (see
the next section) implies that the future value of a worker is always positive. So even in this setup,
some firms have an incentive to use STW.
It should further be noted that it is both in the interest of the firm and the worker to use STW rather
than to separate the match. The firm is free to choose the optimal working time reduction. Thus, it
35See Figure 13 in the Appendix for a graphical illustration of the distribution of the idiosyncratic shock and both thresh-
old values.
36Note that the increase in Jt+1 also indirectly shifts the STW threshold. However, the described direct effect is absent
and therefore vf shifts by more than vk.
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will only use a positive level of STW if this increases profits. Although the worker has no choice in
our model, her participation constraint will not be violated. Even though STW reduces her income
relative to full employment, the worker is even worse off if she quits. In that case the income in the
current period would be just the unemployment benefit b, while it is bK + (1 − K)w if the worker
stays employed and on STW (as usual under German STW rules). Thus, since w > b, a quit would
imply a loss in contemporaneous income. Furthermore, quitting the job implies a lower chance of
having a job in the next period and, thus, reduces the continuation value of the worker.
We are now in a position to define the expected value of a worker, before the realization of the
idiosyncratic shock ε is known:
Jt+1 = (1− φ
x)
∫ vkt+1
−∞
(at+1 − wt+1 − εt+1) g(εt+1)dεt+1
+ (1− φx)
∫ vft+1
vkt+1
[
(at+1 − wt+1 − εt+1)
(
1−K (εt+1)
)
− C
(
K (εt+1)
)]
g (εt+1) dεt+1
− (1− φt+1) cf − (1− φ
x)φet+1f + (1− φt+1)Et+1βJt+2. (11)
Here,
φt+1 = φ
x + (1− φx)φet+1, (12)
is the overall rate of job destruction, which depends on the endogenous rate of job destruction defined
in (9) and on the exogenous rate of job destruction φx. The first integral in equation (11) is the
expected revenue of workers who work full-time. The second integral is the expected revenue of
workers on STW. Here, we need to take into account that these workers have reduced working time,
but that the firm has to incur the cost of STW. The fixed cost has to be paid for all employed workers.
The firing cost has to be paid only for endogenous, not for exogenous separations.
5.3 Matching on the labor market
While we have focused on the firing and STW decision of the firm so far, we now formulate the rest
of the labor market. Matches m are determined by a Cobb-Douglas matching function
mt = µu
α
t v
1−α
t , (13)
where u is unemployment, v are vacancies and α is the matching elasticity with respect to unem-
ployment. The parameter µ > 0 is the matching efficiency. We assume free entry of vacancies. The
worker finding rate q (i.e., the probability of a firm to fill a vacancy) is
qt = µθ
−α
t , (14)
where θ = v/u is the labor market-tightness. Consequently, the job finding rate η (i.e., the probability
of an unemployed worker to find a job) is
ηt = µθ
1−α
t . (15)
The present value of a vacancy is defined as37
Vt = −κ+ βEtqtJt+1 + Etβ (1− qt)Vt+1 (16)
37Note that we have assumed that new matches are also subject to separation risk. This is taken into account in the
definition of Jt+1 in equation (11).
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where J is the value of a job and κ are the vacancy posting costs. Free entry implies that in equilibrium
Vt = 0 ∀ t which simplifies the above equation to
κ = βEtqtJt+1. (17)
Thus, in equilibrium the vacancy posting cost has to equal the expected payoff of the vacancy,
which consists of the probability to find a worker and the value of a successful match.
5.4 Employment evolution
The evolution of the employment rate nt = 1− ut in this economy is described by
nt = (1− φt)nt−1 + (1− φt) ηt−1 (1− nt−1) . (18)
Thus, the employment rate in the current period includes workers of the previous period who were not
fired and unemployed workers who got newly matched. As stated above, this law of motion reflects
that both existing and new matches are subject to the separation risk. Workers on STW are treated
as employed, corresponding to the official German employment statistics (although they do not work
full time).
5.5 Wage bargaining
Finally, we specify wage formation. Collective wage bargaining is the predominant regime in con-
tinental Europe and especially in Germany.38 Therefore, we use a simple model of collective wage
bargaining for our baseline simulation. We assume that the wage is bargained between the represen-
tative firm and the incumbent worker for whom the realization of the profitability shock equals its
expectation of zero. Every worker who is working full time earns this wage. Every worker who is on
STW gets a share of this wage, according to her working time (plus some reimbursement for the lost
wage income). Hence, the wage does not depend on the idiosyncratic profitability of a worker, which
implies inefficient separations. However, we will also show the results for individual wage bargaining.
The profit of the median worker-firm pair (with idiosyncratic profitability shock zero) of a match
is39
Ft = at − wt − cf + βEt (1− φt+1) Jt+1. (19)
In case of disagreement, production will come to a halt (e.g., due to a strike), and bargaining will
resume in the next period. Hence, the match stays intact in the case of disagreement. This particular
feature of the bargaining setup is described in more detail in Hall and Milgrom (2007) and used in
Lechthaler et al. (2010) or Christiano et al. (2012). It is especially plausible under collective bar-
gaining since it is unlikely that all workers become unemployed in case of a disagreement. Thus, the
fall-back option of the firm is
F˜t = −cf + βEt (1− φt+1) Jt+1. (20)
The median workers’ surplus W from a match is
Wt = wt + βEt (1− φt+1)Wt+1 + βEtφt+1Ut+1 (21)
38According to OECD (2012a), the collective bargaining coverage (share of contracts covered by collective bargaining)
in Germany was 72% in 1990 and 62% in 2009.
39Note that the median worker-firm pair does not use STW (empirically, on average only 0.69% of German employees
are in STW programs).
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where U is the value of unemployment, defined as Ut = b + ηt (1− φt+1)Wt+1 +
(1− ηt (1− φt+1))Ut+1. The workers’ fall-back option under disagreement is then
W˜t = b+ βEt (1− φt+1)Wt+1 + βEtφt+1Ut+1. (22)
This means that in case of no production, workers are assumed to obtain a payment b, which is equal
to the unemployment benefits in the economy.
Defining γ as workers’ bargaining power and maximizing the Nash product yields the following
wage equation:
wt = γat + (1− γ) b. (23)
In the Section 6, we will check for the robustness of our results by using individually bargained
wages (including the profitability shock and the market tightness).
5.6 Government budget constraint
The government has a balanced budget and finances STW expenses and unemployment benefits
through a lump-sum tax:
bnt
∫ vft
vkt
K (εt) g(ε)dεt + but = Tt. (24)
We explore the robustness of our results to the possibility to finance STW through (distortionary)
income taxation instead of lump-sum taxes below.
5.7 Equilibrium and aggregation
The labor market equilibrium is defined by equations (3), (7), (8), (9), (10), (18) and (23). Aggregate
output (Y ) in our model is defined as
Yt =
nt
1− φet
∫ vkt
−∞
(at − εt) g (εt) dε+
nt
1− φet
∫ vft
vkt
(1−K (εt)) (at − εt) g (εt) dε
− ntcf −
nt
1− φet
φetf − vtκ. (25)
Aggregate output equals production (first line) minus resource costs (second line). Note, that nt is the
number of all workers employed in period t, i.e., after taking into account the separation risk. There-
fore, we need to divide nt by (1− φet ) to get the number of available workers before endogenous
separations. When determining production we need to take into account the idiosyncratic profitabili-
ties of all relevant workers, i.e., those that work full time and those that work reduced hours on STW.
The resource costs include vacancy posting costs, firing costs and fixed costs of production. Since our
model does not contain any other aggregate demand components, aggregate output equals aggregate
consumption in our model.
6 Numerical simulation
This section first describes our calibration strategy. Then we present the results of numerical simula-
tions. Our model allows for two types of shocks: a discretionary change in STW policy and a business
cycle shock. We first analyze the effects of the policy shock and compare them to our SVAR results.
Then we analyze how large the automatic stabilizing effects of STW are in response to business cycle
shocks.
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6.1 Calibration
Parameter Value
β discount factor 0.99
κ cost of posting a vacancy 1.21
α matching elasticity w.r.t unemployment 0.60
µ matching efficiency 0.43
b/w replacement rate 0.65
f linear firing costs 2.40
s scale parameter of the profitability distribution 1.03
cK shift parameter in STW cost function 20.22
a productivity 1
cf fixed cost of production 0.23
Steady state targets Value
q worker finding rate 0.70
φ overall job destruction rate 0.03
endogenous 1/3, exogenous 2/3
η job finding rate 0.31
u unemployment rate 0.09
χ short-time work rate 0.007
Table 2: Calibration.
We calibrate the baseline model to the German economy. Table 2 summarizes our parameters and
our calibration targets. The quarterly discount factor β is 0.99, which matches an annual real interest
rate of 4.1%. Following Christoffel et al. (2009), we target a steady state value for the quarterly
worker finding rate q of 70% and a separation rate of 3%. As in Krause and Lubik (2007) one third of
separations is endogenous, whereas two thirds are exogenously determined. We target the quarterly
job finding rate η to 31.2% to obtain a steady state unemployment rate of 9% (Christoffel et al., 2009).
The matching elasticity α is set to 0.6. We calibrate unemployment benefits b to 65% of the wage and
set the bargaining power to an intermediate value of γ = 0.5.
We have to set several parameters to obtain the steady state values of the labor market flow rates.
We assume that the idiosyncratic profitability shock follows a logistic distribution,40 which we nor-
malize to have an unconditional mean of zero. To achieve our calibration target, we set the scale
parameter s of the distribution to 1.03. The costs of posting a vacancy κ is set to 1.21 and the effi-
ciency of matching µ is set to 0.43. In line with Bentolila and Bertola (1990), we set firing costs to
60% of annual productivity. In the numerical section, we will check the robustness of our results by
reducing this value to 30% and 0%.
The steady state short-time work rate χ is targeted to 0.69%, which is in line with German data.
Note that this implies a value for cK of 20.22. This value appears to be large, but in the aggregate the
convex STW costs amount to only 0.3% of output.
We set the fixed costs of production cf to 0.23 in order to target the contemporaneous elasticity
of the extensive margin of STW with respect output changes of −3.3. This estimate corresponds to
our lower bound. As discussed above, our estimated elasticity may not take into account the general
40A logistic distribution is very close to a normal distribution, but allows for closed form solutions.
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equilibrium effects of changing labor market tightness on wages and hence other aggregate variables.
However, these effects are absent in our baseline model due to the assumed bargaining game. Thus,
the calibration strategy is consistent with our model.
6.2 Policy shock
We simulate the responses of the model economy to a change in STW policy. More precisely, the
government weakens the eligibility criteria for STW, i.e., it increases the level of D, for only one
period and returns to the old rules one period later. Figure 4 illustrates the results. Due to the increase
in D, the STW threshold vkt falls (see equation (3)). Thus, the fraction of short-time workers χ
increases. Interestingly, although the policy increases STW, it has no effects on unemployment. The
policy intervention allows more workers to use STW that would not have been fired even in absence of
the policy intervention and thus leaves firing unaffected (compare equation (8) which does not depend
on D). This means that the policy has a deadweight effect of 100%. Thus, our model provides a
rationale for the non-effect of the discretionary policy shock on unemployment, found in the SVAR.
Despite the ineffectiveness of the policy in terms of unemployment, our model shows a one period
effect on output. The reason is that unprofitable worker-firm pairs can reduce their working time. This
leads to a positive effect in the resource constraint. At first it might seem surprising that a working
time reduction can increase output, but it is in fact quite plausible that a temporary downscaling of
inefficient production units has a positive effect on output. This is again in line with the results from
the SVAR, albeit with a somewhat different timing.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of a positive one unit shock to D. Impulse responses are given as deviations from the
steady state. The shock is implemented as a temporary, one-period loosening of the STW eligibility criterion.
In contrast to the SVAR, our model allows us to experiment with different policy interventions.
Figure 5 illustrates this for a persistent increase in D, with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.5. Such
a policy intervention has an effect on hiring, firing and unemployment. Increasing D persistently
allows firms to send more workers on STW in the future and to reduce the potential losses in case of
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an adverse profitability shock. Consequently, the expected value of a job J goes up, firing goes down
and vacancy posting goes up (see equations (8), (11), and (16)). Note, however, that the effects of the
persistent policy on unemployment are quantitatively very small.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of a positive one unit shock to D. Impulse responses are given as deviations from the
steady state. The shock is implemented as a temporary autoregressive loosening of the STW eligibility criterion.
All in all, the model results and the SVAR results are very coherent. According to the model,
very temporary discretionary interventions are ineffective. However, discretionary policy interven-
tions may have a small effect on unemployment if they are used more persistently and thus exert a
stronger effect on future expectations. The results from the SVAR indicate that the discretionary pol-
icy component is used in a very temporary fashion in Germany. The significant increase of STW after
a policy shock lasts for at most two periods, as Figure 3 documents. Thus, it is not surprising that
firms’ future expectations are hardly affected.
6.3 Automatic Stabilization
6.3.1 Baseline Scenario
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses to a positive, one standard deviation shock (normalized to 1%)
to aggregate productivity a, with autocorrelation 0.95 (see solid lines for IRFs in the economy with
STW). An increase in productivity increases the value of a filled job J , which implies that firms post
more vacancies. Consequently, the labor market tightness θ and the hiring rate η go up. The increase
in productivity also has a positive effect on the firing cutoff vft , i.e., the endogenous firing rate φet
goes down. The reduction in firing and the increase in hiring lead to an increase in employment and
output and a decline in unemployment. Due to our assumption of fixed costs of production, our model
replicates two important stylized facts of the business cycle. First, our model shows a Beveridge
curve, i.e., a negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies. Second, the labor market
variables are more volatile than productivity and output. The standard deviation of unemployment in
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our simulation is 3 times larger than the standard deviation of the underlying productivity shock.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of a positive shock to aggregate productivity. Impulse responses are given as deviations
from the steady state. The shock is implemented as a temporary autoregressive reduction in aggregate productivity.
What happens to STW in a recession? With a negative aggregate productivity shock, more worker-
firm pairs are automatically eligible for STW and the share of workers on STW increases. However,
the average quality of workers on STW increases in a recession, because more low-quality workers
are fired. It follows that the average reduction of working hours due to STW decreases. Overall, hours
per worker in the economy fall.
Remember that this is well in line with the stylized facts presented in Section 2: the extensive
margin of STW (the share of workers on STW) moves countercyclically while the intensive margin
of STW (the average hours-reduction of a worker on STW) is procyclical. Overall, hours per worker
fall in recessions. Our model replicates all those facts very well. In the dynamic simulation, output
and the share of workers on STW have a correlation of −0.96. Output and the average reduction of
working hours have a correlation of 0.96.
In order to assess the role of STW as an automatic stabilizer of the labor market and the macroe-
conomy, we compare business cycle statistics of an economy with and without STW. We keep all
parameters the same in both scenarios. This assures that our stabilization results are not driven by
parameter changes, but has the drawback that the steady states differ between the two scenarios. In
Section 6.3.2 below we recalibrate the model without STW so that both models yield the same steady
state and show that the differing steady states are not responsible for our results.
The second column in Table 3 shows the difference in the volatility of output and unemployment
for our baseline scenario with constant parameters. The presence of STW reduces the standard de-
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Stabilization in % baseline lower firing costs distortionary fixed
f = 1.2 f = 0 taxation steady states
Output y 3.8 3.5 2.7 3.9 6.3
Unemployment u 21.2 13.1 6.5 20.9 14.9
Table 3: Reduction of the standard deviation in the model with STW compared to the model without STW. We use
HP filtered deviations from steady state (smoothing parameter λ = 1, 600). For output, we use log-deviations, for
unemployment level deviations, since this variable is already denoted as a percentage.
viation of the cyclical component of output, by roughly 4% and reduces unemployment fluctuations
measured by the absolute deviation of the cyclical component by roughly 21%. With a negative ag-
gregate productivity shock, more firms are automatically eligible to use this instrument. Thus, in
contrast to the economy without STW, some firms reduce the working time instead of firing workers
and, therefore, reduce unemployment fluctuations.
The stabilization of unemployment comes at the cost that STW induces firms to keep unprofitable
workers employed, who would otherwise have been fired. With and without STW, the average qual-
ity of the workforce increases in a recession because relatively more unprofitable workers are fired.
This effect tends to counteract the decrease in aggregate productivity and thus reduces fluctuations
in aggregate output. Since less workers are fired, the average quality of the workforce increases by
less in recessions in the economy with STW compared to the economy without STW. Put differently,
we have two counteracting effects: On the one hand, STW reduces unemployment fluctuations and
thus output fluctuations via the production function. On the other hand, STW reduces the stabilizing
effect of adjustments in the quality of the workforce (smaller cleansing effect of recessions). Natu-
rally, the first effect dominates, but the second effect implies that STW stabilizes output by less than
unemployment.
Is a stabilization of 4% of GDP fluctuations and 21% of unemployment fluctuations a lot? To
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the automatic stabilization, we have to relate the stabilization effects
to the expenditures. Between 1998 and 2011 on average 0.7% of all workers are on STW. The average
costs of STW accounted for just 0.01% of GDP in our model. In the data, the cost of STW in
terms of GDP was 0.03%.41 How does this compare to other automatic stabilizers such as the tax
system? The estimated size of the automatic stabilization of the income tax system depends on the
employed methodology and the analyzed country. The existing literature predicts an automatic output
stabilization between 8% and 30% (see Table 2 in in’t Veld et al., 2012). Given that the income tax
system accounts for roughly 10% of GDP in the OECD average (see OECD Statistics, OECD, 2012b),
the stabilization through STW appears to be large relative to the costs.42
6.3.2 Robustness
In a first robustness check, we reduce firing costs from 240% of quarterly productivity (i.e. 60% of
the annual productivity) to 120% and 0%, respectively. All the other parameters remain the same.
Two results are worthwhile to be pointed out. First, lower firing costs lead to a smaller automatic
stabilization effect of STW. In this case, frictional costs fluctuate less and, hence, the possibility of
41To calculate this number, we have used the gross transfers to workers due to STW according to the balance sheet of the
Federal Employment Agency. At the peak in 2009 the costs were 0.13% of GDP.
42Note that we compare the income tax system to STW based on GDP-shares and stabilization effects only, not taking
into account other potentially important aspects such as the effect on governmental revenue or the reduction of income
inequality.
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STW to dampen these fluctuations is reduced. Second, STW also stabilizes an economy without firing
costs. This certainly does not correspond to German institutions, but it illustrates that firms have an
incentive to use STW even when firing is costless. This is the case, because finding new workers is
costly in a labor market with search and matching and, thus, some labor hoarding is optimal.
Next we assume that additional expenses due to the cyclical variation in STW are financed by an
immediate increase in a distortionary proportional income tax.43 Given that we assume a balanced
budget, the bargaining outcome is directly affected by tax increases. As expected, a distortionary
financing of STW reduces the unemployment stabilization effects. The reduction is surprisingly small,
however. The reason is that the STW in our model is very cost-efficient and thus the extra costs in a
recession due to the automatic reaction of STW are small.44
In order to exclude that our results are driven by steady state shifts, we adjust the standard devia-
tion of the idiosyncratic profitability shocks and the vacancy posting costs to obtain the same steady
states for the labor market flows in all versions of the model.45 Interestingly, with fixed steady states
all results are very similar compared to the scenario with fixed parameters. In our baseline scenario,
output fluctuations drop by 6% and employment fluctuations by 15%. Lower firing costs lead to
somewhat less stabilization and distortionary taxes leave the results almost unchanged.
6.3.3 Simulation for the US Economy
So far, we have performed our simulations based on German labor market flows (which are roughly
three times smaller than in the United States), collective bargaining and substantial firing costs. Low-
ering firing costs as a robustness check has indicated that labor market institutions are important for
the quantitative results. To obtain an idea about the potential effects of STW in an anglosaxon country,
we repeat our exercise under standard individual Nash bargaining, where the threat point of worker
and firm is the termination of the match, and recalibrate the model to match the US economy. This is
of course only a rough quantification of the potential stabilizing effects of STW in the US, since, in
contrast to our earlier analysis, it is not based on an empirically estimated elasticity of STW. However,
this scenario demonstrates that STW is likely to be less stabilizing in more flexible labor markets.
Thus, the wage is given by
wt (εt) = γ (at − εt − cf + κθt) + (1− γ) b. (26)
Note that in contrast to our baseline with collectively bargained wages, the wage now depends on the
tightness of the labor market and the idiosyncratic profitability of a worker. The latter implies that the
risk stemming from idiosyncratic shocks is better shared between worker and firm. Note, however,
that there is still some scope for STW. Due to costly hiring (vacancies are associated with costs and
are only filled with a certain probability), the future value of a worker is positive. This implies that
some workers are retained even though they generate contemporaneous losses. Putting these workers
on STW reduces the losses they generate and is therefore beneficial for the firm.
In our parametrization, we target US labor market flows, namely a job destruction rate of 0.1, a
job finding rate of 0.81 and a worker finding rate of 0.7 (Krause and Lubik, 2007). The efficiency
of the matching function, the costs of posting a vacancy and the scale parameter of the idiosyncratic
43Thus, the bargaining equation changes to wt = γat + (1− γ) b/(1− τ ), where τ is the proportional income tax.
44Output fluctuations are even a little bit smaller with distortionary taxes than without. The reason is that not only
employment fluctuates somewhat more with distortionary taxes, but also the frictional costs, which are deducted in the
resource constraint.
45Note, however, that we do not adjust the fixed costs of production, which are the driving force for the amplification and
the elasticity of STW with respect to output.
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profitability distribution are used to match these targets. In line with US institutions, we set firing costs
to zero and the replacement rate to 0.4. All other parameters remain the same (and are summarized in
Table 8 in the Appendix). We run two STW scenarios: one with the German parameter cK and one
with the German steady STW rate χ, which necessitates a recalibration of cK (values in parentheses
in Table 8 in the Appendix).
Using the same parameter value for STW costs cK as in our baseline calibration leads to a much
lower STW take up than in our previous simulations. The share of workers on STW, χ, in the steady
state drops from 0.7% to 0.1%. This is not surprising. Lower firing costs and larger labor market flows
imply that adjustments via the extensive margin are much easier and less costly than in our baseline
scenario. Additionally, the flexibility of individually bargained wages allows easier adjustments in
response to idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, the possibility to adjust via the intensive margin appears
much less attractive. This is, in fact, well in line with Figure 7 in the Appendix, showing that STW
is not much used in the United States. Naturally, this leads to much lower stabilization (see Table 4).
Output fluctuations are reduced by only 0.1% and unemployment fluctuations are reduced by 0.7%
compared to an economy without STW.
Stabilization in % German case US case
baseline German cK German STW share
Output y 3.8 0.1 0.5
Unemployment u 21.2 0.7 4.0
Table 4: Reduction of the standard deviation in the model with STW compared to the model without STW. We use
HP filtered deviations from steady state (smoothing parameter λ = 1, 600). For output, we use log-deviations, for
unemployment level deviations, since this variable is already denoted as a percentage.
Suppose next that the US government promotes the use of STW with the goal of achieving a
similar steady state proportion of workers on STW as observed in Germany. To analyze this scenario,
we recalibrate cK to 3.5, which implies that χ rises to 0.7%. Nevertheless, the stabilization through
STW over the business cycle is still much lower than in our baseline scenario for Germany. Table
4 shows that unemployment fluctuations are reduced by 4% and output fluctuations by 0.5%. Based
on the most optimistic stabilization results, a back-of-the envelope calculation suggests that STW
would have buffered the increase in US unemployment from 5 to 10% in October 2009 by only 0.2
percentage points, i.e., to 9.8%. Again, this is due to the higher flexibility of the US economy. Making
STW cheaper, implies of course that more firms use it in steady state, but still the other margins
of adjustment appear more attractive in response to business cycle shocks. Overall, our analysis
suggests that STW can be an important margin of adjustment for otherwise rigid labor markets, but
the additional benefit for labor markets which are already flexible is rather limited.
7 Lessons and Outlook
"... it’s time to try something different." (Paul Krugman, 2009)
Does our analysis suggest that Paul Krugman (2009) is right that STW was an important job
saver in the Great Recession? We argue that STW can act as a powerful automatic stabilizer, but that
the empirical evidence concerning discretionary policy changes is rather disappointing. According
to our SVAR evidence a discretionary change in STW policy has no effect on unemployment. Our
theoretical model provides a plausible explanation for this puzzling result. A discretionary loosening
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of the STW eligibility criterion only subsidizes worker-firm pairs that would not have been destroyed
even in absence of the intervention. If the discretionary intervention is used in a transitory way, firms’
future expectations remain unaffected and no additional jobs are saved. In contrast, rules both have a
direct effect on unemployment through a reduction of the firing threshold and indirectly affect firm’s
hiring and firing decisions via future expectations.
These results suggest that it is crucial to disentangle those two components. One additional worker
on STW due to a discretionary intervention may have no effect, while one additional worker on STW
due to automatic adjustments may stabilize the economy. Not differentiating these two different cases
may lead to biases when estimating the effects of STW on the macroeconomic level.
Our empirical results for the discretionary component of STW are derived from a SVAR for the
post-reunification period (note that it is impossible to run a SVAR just for the crisis). Since the
results remain largely unchanged when we include dummies for deep recessions (Great Recession,
unification and oil price crises), we infer that the discretionary interventions in Germany in the Great
Recession did not save jobs.
However, the automatic stabilization effects of STW were also at work in the Great Recession.
When we feed a GDP shock into our SVAR that leads to a 6.6% decline of GDP, equivalent to the
German peak-to-trough movement in the Great Recession (Burda and Hunt, 2011), this shock gen-
erates an increase of unemployment of 4.82 percentage points within a year according to the SVAR.
To quantify the automatic stabilization effects of STW in the Great Recession, we feed an aggregate
shock into our model with STW that also leads to a peak increase of unemployment of 4.82 percent
points. In the model without STW the same aggregate shock leads to an increase of unemployment
of 6.11 percentage points. Thus, our counterfactual analysis predicts that the automatic component
of STW has prevented an increase in German unemployment of 1.29 percentage points, i.e., it saved
roughly 466, 000 German jobs in the Great Recession.
Our calculation suggests that STW saved many jobs but STW alone cannot explain the non-
response of unemployment in Germany in the Great Recession. Thus, additional forces must have
been at work. Möller (2010) and Burda and Hunt (2011) point towards the role of working time
accounts, which gained importance in the recent years and have contributed to make the intensive
margin more flexible in the Great Recession. Boysen-Hogrefe and Groll (2010) show that unit labor
costs (wages normalized by productivity) fell a lot before the recession. This may have had an impact
on firms’ labor demand. Burda and Hunt (2011) argue that firms were overly pessimistic in the 2005-
2007 economic upturn, did not hire enough workers and thus had to reduce the employment stock
by less in the Great Recession. Clearly, some or all of these aspects could be incorporated into our
model-based analysis. We leave this to future research and focus on a more detailed investigation of
STW instead.
Thus, Krugman is right that STW has indeed contributed to the German labor market miracle.
But our analysis also shows that the institutional setup is crucial for the automatic stabilization effects
of STW. According to the model simulations, economies with larger firing costs and collective wage
bargaining can expect stronger stabilization effects from STW. Individually bargained wages allow the
adjustment of wages in response to idiosyncratic shock. Under collective bargaining this adjustment
is precluded, implying that idiosyncratic shocks are more costly to the firm. STW partly reduces the
inflexibility imposed by collective bargaining and thereby stabilizes employment.
Large firing costs make it costly to adjust along the extensive margin. In such an environment
STW increases the flexibility of the intensive margin of labor adjustment and hence prevents firings
that constitute resource costs to the firm and the economy. Cahuc and Carcillo (2011) show that there
is indeed a positive cross-country correlation between the average level of firing costs (measured by
the OECD employment protection legislation index) and the STW take-up rate in the Great Reces-
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sion. Thus, policy makers seem to understand well that the largest benefits of STW can be reaped in
economies with large firing costs.
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Appendix
Variable Source
Short-time workers German Federal Employment Agency
Employment German Federal Employment Agency
Unemployment rate German Federal Employment Agency
Hours worked Institute for Employment Research
GDP Deutsche Bundesbank
GDP deflator German Federal Statistical Office
CPI German Federal Statistical Office
ifo business climate index ifo Institute for Economic Research
3-month money market rate Deutsche Bundesbank
Consumption German Federal Statistical Office
Gross investment German Federal Statistical Office
Table 5: Data sources. We take quarterly averages of all monthly series, since not all data is available at monthly
frequency. All series are seasonally adjusted using Census’ X12-ARIMA procedure.
All 2003 2006 2009 2010
Observations 64,056 16,067 15,912 15,909 16,168
Firms using STW 4202 622 231 1648 1701
Mean of STW/EMP, in % 3.34 2.03 0.74 5.63 4.93
Mean of STW/EMP, in %, only STW firms 50.90 52.41 51.55 54.37 46.90
Table 6: Descriptives on STW data in IAB establishment panel
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Response in output Response in unemployment
Sign (qrt.) Significant in qrt. Sign (qrt.) Significant in qrt.
Baseline (1993-2010)
baseline - (1) none + none
+ (2-) 2
with recession dummies - (0) none + none
+ (1-) 2
with legal change dummies - (0-1) none + none
+ (2-) 2
with labor productivity instead of output - (0) none + none
+ (1-) 2
with GDP deflator - (0-1) none - (0-5) none
+ (2-) 2 + (6-) none
with employment instead of unemployment - (0-1) none + (0-1) none
+ (2-) none - (2-) none
with total hours instead of unemployment - (0-1) none - (0-5) none
+ (2-) none + (6-) none
with ifo index as control - (0) none + none
+ (1-) none
with interest rate as control - (0) none + none
+ (1-) 2
with consumption growth as control - (0) none + none
+ (1-) none
with investment growth as control - (0) none + none
+ (1-) 2
Long sample (1975-2010)
baseline - (0-1) 1 + none
+ (2-) none
with recession dummies - (0-1) none + none
+ (2-) none
Table 7: Summary of robustness checks. The table reports the sign and significance of the responses in output and
unemployment to a STW policy shock. Significance is based on 90% bootstrapped confidence bands. Each row
reports the sign of the response, the corresponding horizon (in quarters) in which the sign occurs, and whether the
response is significant or not. When the sign of the respective impulse-response changes, the next row indicates this
change, the corresponding horizon and the significance.
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Parameter Value
German type US type
economy economy
β discount factor 0.99
κ cost of posting a vacancy 1.21 0.34
α matching elasticity w.r.t unemployment 0.60
µ matching efficiency 0.43 0.77
b/w replacement rate 0.65 0.4
f linear firing costs 2.40 0
s scale parameter of profitability distribution 1.03 0.32 (0.34)
cK shift parameter in STW cost function 20.22 20.22 (3.50)
a productivity 1
cf fixed cost of production 0.23
Steady state targets Value
q worker finding rate 0.70
φ overall job destruction rate 0.03 0.1
endogenous 1/3, exogenous 2/3
η job finding rate 0.31 0.81
u unemployment rate 0.09 0.12
χ short-time work rate 0.007 not targeted (0.007)
Table 8: Calibration of US type economy.
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Figure 7: STW as a percentage of total employment across OECD countries in 2009 (Cahuc and Carcillo, 2011).
We thank Pierre Cahuc for providing the data set.
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Figure 8: Short-time work in Germany 1975-2012. The series depicts the log of the number of short-time workers
as a fraction of total employment.
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Figure 9: Correlation of number of short-time workers as a fraction of employment with GDP and employment.
Leads/lags depict the correlation of STW/EMP in period t with GDP or employment in period t+ i / t− i. Black
bars show correlations over the long sample corresponding to 1975 to 2010, gray bars show the short
post-reunification sample corresponding to 1993-2010. White bars show correlations over the long sample without
STW peaks in the 4 recessions.
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Figure 10: Estimated output and STW shocks from baseline VAR. The solid series shows the actual shock, the
dashed series is smoothed with a centered moving average with four leads and lags and triangularly declining
weights. SVAR estimated with STW per employed workers, GDP growth and unemployment (all in logs) for
1993Q1 to 2010Q4.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to policy shocks for different output elasticities of STW η. SVAR estimated with
STW per employed workers, GDP growth and unemployment (all in logs) for 1993Q1 to 2010Q4. Quarterly
responses to a positive one-standard deviation shock. Confidence intervals are 90% bootstrapped bands with 10,000
draws.
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Figure 12: Legal changes in duration of eligibility of short-time work. The series describes legal maximum period
of eligibility of a worker under short-time work scheme. Vertical lines show the timing of the corresponding
legislation.
Figure 13: Illustration of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks to the worker-firm pair and firing threshold vft and
STW threshold vft .
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